University of Rhode Island

DigitalCommons@URI
Open Access Master's Theses
2015

Vulnerable Web Application Framework
Nicholas J. Giannini
University of Rhode Island, ngiannini@my.uri.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses

Recommended Citation
Giannini, Nicholas J., "Vulnerable Web Application Framework" (2015). Open Access Master's Theses.
Paper 629.
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses/629

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Open Access Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.

VULNERABLE WEB APPLICATION FRAMEWORK
BY
NICHOLAS J. GIANNINI

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
COMPUTER SCIENCE AND STATISTICS

UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND
2015

MASTER OF SCIENCE THESIS
OF
NICHOLAS GIANNINI

APPROVED:
Thesis Committee:
Major Professor

Victor Fay-Wolfe
Lisa DiPippo
Haibo He

Nasser H. Zawia
DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND
2015

ABSTRACT
Utilizing intentionally vulnerable web applications to teach and practice cyber
security principles and techniques provides a unique hands-on experience that is
otherwise unobtainable without working in the real world. Creating such applications
that emulate those of actual businesses and organizations without exposing actual
businesses to inadvertent security risks can be a daunting task. To address these
issues, this project has created Porous, an open source framework specifically for
creating intentionally vulnerable web applications. The implementation of Porous
offers a simplified approach to building realistic vulnerable web applications that may
be tailored to the needs of specific cyber challenges or classroom exercises.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In today’s era of digital information, web applications, which commonly act as
publicly facing entities for many businesses and organizations, are often the target of
malicious attacks by hackers who wish to steal customer data or pivot their way
deeper into an organization’s internal network. It is essential that education and
training for industry professionals has intentionally vulnerable web applications for
realistic training in how to secure those applications.
1.1 Statement of the Problem
There are some web applications available that are designed to be deliberately
vulnerable for training purposes. However, many of these vulnerable web applications
are either outdated, not configurable, are of limited utility for realistic training, or
consist of static content that limits them to a single time use in training. Furthermore,
most training web applications are created from scratch – a very time-consuming and
difficult task with little to no re-use of the development effort shared amongst
developers. To solve this problem, this project implemented a web application
framework called Porous that simplifies the process of developing configurable
vulnerable web applications for training purposes by abstracting out the common
structure and functionalities that are found in a typical web application. By using
Porous, application developers will be able to better focus on developing the aspects
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of an individual web application that makes it unique rather than devoting effort to the
basic structure of the vulnerable web application.
1.2 Justification for and Significance of the Study
According to the Website Security Statistics Report published by Whitehat
Security [1], an organization that provides website risk management solutions,
approximately 86% of all surveyed websites have at least one serious vulnerability,
with most having far more. Of the vulnerabilities found, only 61% were resolved and
required an average of 193 days to resolve from the date of first customer notification.
In addition, only 57% of surveyed organizations said they provide some form of
software security training to their programmers. These statistics illustrate the
overwhelming amount of vulnerabilities that are present in today’s web applications as
well as the lack of qualified security professionals working within organizations.
There are two use cases for creating intentionally vulnerable web applications
within the context of cyber security education. The first use case, tutorials, require
stand-alone web applications that reinforce individual lessons or allow students to
practice a particular technique. The second use case, for which the Porous framework
was developed, is cyber challenges. A cyber challenge is an interactive learning
environment where students are given hands-on experience practicing cyber security
skills without the legal or moral implications that are often associated with using such
techniques in the real world. The role of web applications within cyber challenges is
that they simulate the web applications of realistic businesses and organizations.
Since the individual needs of a business or organization vary drastically, it can be a
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difficult and time consuming task to build custom web applications for each cyber
challenge scenario.
1.3 Goals
The goal of this project is to create a web application framework that may be used
to develop intentionally vulnerable web applications. In order to accomplish this goal,
the framework must:
1. Simplify the development of vulnerable web applications
2. Provide configurable security features
3. Be evocative of current web application security concerns
4. Be extensible
1.4 Summary of Accomplishments
The result of this project was the creation of the Porous web application
framework that may be used to develop intentionally vulnerable web applications.
The Porous framework met the goals specified above in Section 1.3 by implementing
an extensible structure that allows for the configuration of security features within the
components that are commonly found in web applications.
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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter serves to elaborate on material, both conceptual and technical, that
has assisted in the development of the web application framework that corresponds to
the goals of Section 1.3 by providing context, inspiration, and foundational
information to this research. The chapter will begin by first defining what exactly a
web application framework is and how they assist in the development of web
applications. Next, it will discuss related works that have had either similar goals or
are complementary to this project. Afterwards, there is a discussion of the
technologies used in the development of the web application framework for this
project. And lastly, the target audiences that this framework is intended for are
defined.
2.1 Web Application Frameworks
A web application framework is a specific type of software framework that is
designed for easing the development of web applications and services. Software
frameworks are able to ease the development process by providing developers with a
structured abstraction that contains interfaces to functionalities common to the types of
applications the framework was built to develop. In the case of a web application
framework, the framework may provide interfaces to common web application
functions such as routing, cookies, session management, and database management.
The benefit of using such a framework is that code reusability is encouraged thereby
4

facilitating the rapid development of web applications by allowing the application
developer to focus on the business logic of the application instead of the common
components. Web application frameworks and software frameworks in general, can
be further broken down into Full-Stack, Micro, and Monolithic categories based on
how influential they intend to be on the structure of the application and how much
they intend to assist the developer. I now describe each of those framework
categories.
2.1.1

Full-Stack Frameworks
A full-stack framework is a framework that attempts to provide nearly

everything that a developer could possibly need to build an application. It likely
includes components that may not be needed by the majority of applications, but by
having them available makes it easier for new features to be integrated. Examples of
full-stack web application frameworks include Symfony (PHP) [2], Laravel (PHP) [3],
Ruby on Rails (Ruby) [4], and Django (Python) [5].

Figure 1. Sample Architecture of a Full-Stack Framework
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2.1.2

Micro Frameworks
A micro framework is a framework that attempts to provide only the

components that are absolutely necessary for a developer to build an application; or it
may focus on providing the functionality of one particular area very efficiently. Micro
frameworks tend to be better-suited for smaller applications or for applications that are
within the very specific purpose for which the framework was designed. In the case of
web application frameworks, a micro framework may be specifically designed for
building the public application programming interfaces (APIs) for another service or
application. Micro frameworks often need to be extended with additional components
in order to make them provide the functionalities required for the web application
being developed. Examples of micro web application frameworks includes Slim
(PHP) [6], Silex (PHP) [7], Sinatra (Ruby) [8], and Flask (Python) [9].

Figure 2. Sample Architecture of a Micro Framework
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2.1.3

Monolithic Frameworks

A monolithic framework is a framework in which the components cannot be
easily swapped out for different implementations or extended. Both full-stack and
micro frameworks can be monolithic, however it is a more common trait in smaller
micro frameworks. Slim [6], for example, was developed as a monolithic framework
until more recently. The main objective of Slim was to remain lightweight and fast,
which was accomplished by having a highly optimized code base. However, this
came at the cost of having tightly coupled code that could not easily be extended or
modified without affecting the rest of the framework.

Figure 3. Sample Architecture of a Monolithic Framework

2.2 Related Works
2.2.1

Open Cyber Challenge Platform

As mentioned in Section 1.2, one of the motivating factors for developing a web
application framework is developing intentionally vulnerable web applications for use
in cyber challenges. Incidentally, creating cyber challenges themselves is a difficult
and time-consuming task due to the high level of technical ability required to create
7

and implement an individual scenario to be used as a challenge. To help address this
problem, researchers at the University of Rhode Island are actively developing the
Open Cyber Challenge Platform (OCCP) [10], which is an open-source platform for
building cyber challenges that aims to be extensible, modular, and reusable.
Considering the similar goals of both projects, the project being completed for this
these can be seen as a complementary asset to the OCCP. As the OCCP aims to
simplify the development of cyber challenges, the framework described in this thesis
aims to simplify the development of web applications to be used within those
challenges. The figure below displays a sample network that the OCCP may generate
for a scenario. The web applications developed using the framework may be placed
within a web server within such a network design.

Figure 4. OCCP Network Diagram
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2.2.2

Open Web Application Security Project
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [11] is a community

dedicated to the creation of tools, documentation, and technology relating to web
application security. For this reason, several of OWASP’s projects were reviewed
during the completion of this thesis project with the three most significant: The
OWASP Site Generator, the OWASP Top 10, and the OWASP testing project,
described below.
2.2.2.1 OWASP Site Generator
The OWASP Site Generator [12] project was created and sponsored by
Foundstone and SPI Dynamics during the OWASP Spring of Code in 2007. The
project had intentions of creating a tool that could create dynamic websites using
predefined vulnerabilities and web architectural elements based on an XML
configuration file. The web applications generated by this tool were written in
Microsoft’s .NET languages. Later efforts sought to expand to include other language
options. The project had similar goals of simplifying the development of web
applications with configurable security features, however it fell short due to other
design decisions. First, the sites that it generated were based on predefined templates,
which limited the customization of the websites being developed. Second, the tool
was created as a Windows desktop application and generated websites intended to run
on Microsoft’ IIS web servers. This introduced a dependency on the Windows
operating system that could have severely limited the user base of the tool and limited
the tool’s utility for use in cyber challenges by specifying a platform for deployment.
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As of 2008 the project status had changed to inactive, although later efforts to revive
the project occurred and failed in 2009.
2.2.2.2 OWASP Top 10
OWASP categorizes its projects as being in different stages of maturity with the
most mature projects reaching flagship status, which indicates that the project is not
only extremely mature but also has the direct support of OWASP as an organization to
continue to maintain and develop. Perhaps its most venerated flagship project is the
OWASP Top 10 [13], which is a list of the top ten most statistically common web
security concerns. For each of these security concerns, the OWASP provides example
vulnerabilities, attacks, reference materials, and suggestions on how to avoid such
weaknesses. I used this list as a reference for the types of vulnerabilities to include in
Porous.
The most recent list of security flaws at the time of this writing comes from the
2013 OWASP Top 10, which includes:
A1.Injection
Any flaw that allows for untrusted data to be sent to an interpreter as part of a
command or query, which allows for a malicious user to execute unintended
commands or access data without authorization. Example attacks that exploit
these flaws include SQL injection, operating system command injection, and
LDAP injection.
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A2.Broken Authentication and Session Management
Any flaw associated with the authentication of authorized users and the
management of sessions. Example attacks that exploit these flaws include
password attacks, session fixation, and session hijacking.
A3.Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Any flaw that allows for data to be sent to a client web browser without
proper validation or escaping, which allows an attack to execute malicious
scripts.
A4.Insecure Direct Object References
Any flaw that exposes a reference to the internal implementation of an artifact
or asset without proper access controls. These flaws could allow an attacker
to view and/or manipulate directories, files, keys, etc.
A5.Security Misconfiguration
Any flaw associated with having configuration settings in an application,
database, server, or other entity that are insecure either by default or by a
developer’s decision.
A6.Sensitive Data Exposure
Any flaw that exposes sensitive data such as customer information, financial
data, session identifiers, etc. by not properly handling information or not
encrypting it during rest or while in transit.
A7.Missing Function Level Access Control
Any flaw that allows non-privileges users to have access to functions that
should only be available to authorized users.
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A8.Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Any flaw that allows an attacker to trick authenticated users into performing
unintended actions through the use of forged HTTP requests.
A9.Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
Any flaw that results in the exploitation of an application caused by the use of
vulnerable libraries, components, frameworks, or software.
A10.

Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

Any flaw that allows an attacker to take advantage of a redirect or forwarding
feature in a web application to send a victim to a malicious site or to access
unauthorized resources.
2.2.2.3 OWASP Testing Project
The OWASP Testing Project [14] is another flagship project that aims to
provide guidelines for the testing of web applications. The project claims to have
developed a complete testing framework that can be used as a template for testing
applications or to qualify the testing processes or others. It includes testing
methodologies for each stage of development, as well as recommended procedures for
testing various parts of a web application. I used tests from the OWASP Testing
Project to test the components of Porous.
2.2.3

Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA)

The Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA) [15], developed by
RandomStorm, is an open-source PHP/MySQL web application organized into
modules associated with specific vulnerabilities, many of which correspond to those
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described in the OWASP Top 10. Each of these modules contains a low, medium, and
high security example implementation that portrays the vulnerability. I reviewed the
modules of the DVWA when building the components of Porous.
Unfortunately, when I worked with them, several of the modules in the DVWA
had incorrect methods for securing against vulnerabilities [16]. In addition, some
modules secured against entirely different vulnerabilities than they claimed. For
example, the supposed secure implementation of the Brute Force DVWA module still
allows for brute force attacks. Furthermore, the low and medium security
implementations of it do not even portray a brute force attack but rather a SQL
injection flaw. Due to these aforementioned reasons, I disregarded the DVWA as a
reliable source of information for this thesis project.
2.3 Technologies Used
2.3.1

LAMP Stack
According to W3Techs [17], who conduct surveys based on the Alexa top one

million websites [18], approximately 82% of website whose underlying technologies
are known are written in PHP. Additionally, 58.4% use Apache as the web server and
52.2% use Linux as the operating system on which the server runs. While no exact
statistics are provided, MySQL is also claimed to be the most popular open-source
relational database management system used to store web application data.
The combination of these technologies make up what is known as the LAMP
stack (Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP), which, based on these statistics, is the most
popular set of technologies used for the development and deployment of web
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applications. Consequently, I used these technologies as the basis for the development
of Porous.
2.4 Target Audiences
Based on the goals of this project, three target audiences have been identified as
potential users of the Porous framework: Framework Developers, Application
Developers, and Application Users.
2.4.1

Framework Developers
Framework developers are users who may contribute to the development of the

web application framework or its components by extending or modifying it. In order
to contribute to the framework and its components, framework developers must have
advanced knowledge of object-oriented programming and have the necessary security
knowledge to correctly implement components without introducing inadvertent
vulnerabilities.
2.4.2

Application Developers
Application developers are users who develop web applications using the

Porous framework. In order to efficiently develop applications using Porous,
application developers must have had experience developing web applications with
other web application frameworks.
2.4.3

Application Users
Application users are users who interact with the web applications built using

the framework. These users may include students or professionals participating in a
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cyber security course or a cyber challenge. Depending on the course or challenge,
application users may be asked to interact with an application in different manners by
possibly exploiting or patching the application. Subsequently, the expected
knowledge of an application user is dependent on how they will be interacting with the
application.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This chapter consists of two sections. The first section, framework architecture,
delves into the design decisions and implementation details of the framework’s
structure. It also introduces any concepts or patterns that were employed in its
construction. The second section, testing procedures, describes the experiments and
any metrics, both qualitative and quantitative, which were used to measure how
effectively the framework was able to satisfy the goals of this project as defined in
Section 1.3.
3.1 Framework Architecture
The architecture of the framework can be divided into three conceptual areas: the
core, primary components, and auxiliary components. The core is responsible for
bootstrapping, configuring, and running a web application. It also provides the
extensibility mechanisms necessary for integrating both the primary and auxiliary
components. On its own, the core is actually a fully functional micro framework
comparable to the likes of Silex [7] or Slim [6]. Together with the primary and
auxiliary components, it lies closer to being a full-stack framework. I had to make the
design decision whether to either build on top of one of these existing frameworks or
to build an entirely new one. When I was considering building on top of Slim, I
discovered that it was too restrictive to meet the goals of the project. Slim aims to be
as small as possible and therefore did not offer the extensibility or features that were
16

necessary for Porous to meet the goal of section 1.3. When considering Silex, which
is built entirely of Symfony components, I decided that a curation of components from
different members of the open-source community would offer greater flexibility.
Details of which components I chose, and why, can be seen in Section 3.1.1.
When designing the framework architecture, I made a distinction between primary
components, which are directly essential for Porous to meet its goals, and auxiliary
components, which are not essential for Porous to meet its goals. I created a different
implementation of each of the primary components in order to provide both a
vulnerable and secure version. These implementations may also include configuration
options to fine tune their security features. Conversely, I either developed auxiliary
components or took them from the community to provide supporting features for the
application developer, or to act as dependencies for the core or primary components.
The following diagram displays the overall architecture of the Porous framework.
The top section shows the architecture of the framework’s core. The bottom section
displays a few of the primary and auxiliary components that are included with the
framework. Lastly, the middle section shows how these primary and auxiliary
components connect to the framework’s core. The subsections that follow will look
further into the implementation details of the framework’s core, the primary
components, and the auxiliary components.
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Figure 5. Architecture of the Porous Framework

3.1.1

Framework Core
As previously mentioned, the framework core provides the functionality for

bootstrapping, configuring, and running a web application. The core is implemented
as a class called Application, which is the main entry point into any web application
built using the framework. An application developer builds applications by calling
methods from this class. The Application class contains properties and methods for
interacting with the rest of the framework’s components, as well as additional helper
methods for the application developer. The core’s subcomponents, which were taken
from the open-source community, include a dependency injection container and a
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routing layer, which are important aspects in supporting the Porous framework’s
extensibility
3.1.1.1 Dependency Injection Container
Together, the Application class and the dependency injection container act as
the cornerstone of the framework’s core by being the connective “glue” that binds the
primary components, the auxiliary components, and any configuration settings
together in the framework. The Dependency Injection Container allows for new
features to be added and for existing components to be swapped out for different
implementations. This allows application developers to choose between different
vulnerable and secure implementations of components at their own discretion, and is
vital to meeting the goals of the thesis by enabling the framework to be extensible and
modular.
In order to fully comprehend the dependency injection container’s role in the
framework, it is first necessary to understand the related object-oriented design
principles that it was built to employ. First is the concept of inversion of control (IoC)
[19], which is the delegation of control over the program flow to some entity. A basic
example of this concept is event driven programming, where instead of being executed
sequentially, certain instructions are executed upon the arrival of different events. In
the case of the framework, the concept of inversion of control is implemented through
dependency injection, which is a design pattern [19] where the responsibility of
locating or constructing dependencies is separate from the code that uses those
dependencies. The dependency injection pattern can be implemented by either
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inverting control to a service locator or to a dependency injection container; the latter
of which is done in the framework.
Both service locators and dependency injection containers act as a central
repository for dependency definitions and instructions for their construction. Service
locators can in certain circumstances be considered an anti-pattern [20] however, since
every component that uses the locator is aware of its existence. Therefore, the locator
itself is a dependency that must be included in these components. Conversely, with a
dependency injection container the components are unaware of the container’s
existence. Instead, the application uses reflection, which is the ability for a program to
inspect itself at runtime, to determine what dependencies need to be constructed and
injected.
An example of how these patterns work can be seen in the diagrams of Figure
6 below. Diagram A: Class Dependency Map shows the relationship of the classes in
the secure implementation of the session manager component in which the
SessionManager class depends on a SessionHandler, which depends on an Encrypter.
Diagram B: Service Locator shows how the injection of these dependencies would
work when using the service locator pattern. The session manager would first ask the
service locator to locate the session handler. When the session handler is found it asks
the locator to locate the encrypter. Diagram C: Dependency Injection Container
shows how the injection of these dependencies would work when using the
dependency injection container pattern. Here, the application would ask the container
to construct a session manager. Using reflection, the container would recognize that
the session manager requires a session handler parameter to be constructed. The
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container then checks the service definitions it stores and constructs a session handler.
This process is repeated when the container recognizes that the handler requires an
encrypter.
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Figure 6. Managing Class Dependencies with IoC

22

To further augment the benefits of using a dependency injection container the
dependency inversion principle is also employed. The dependency inversion
principle, which is one of the five basic object-oriented programming and design
principles as identified by Robert C. Martin [21], states that both high-level and lowlevel components should rely on abstractions, rather than concrete implementations.
The significance of this is that by having components depend on an interface or
abstract class rather than a specific implementation, the component can be constructed
using any other component that adheres to the interface or extends the abstract class.
The diagram in Figure 7 portrays the dependency injection principle being
employed within the dependency injection container. This example is identical to that
of Diagram C in Figure 6 with the exception that the SessionHandler and Encrypter
classes have been abstracted to interfaces.
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Figure 7. DI Container with DIP Principle Applied

Figure 8 shows the relationship between sample component implementations
and the provider classes that define their construction details, which are then registered
in the container for use in the framework.
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Figure 8. Diagram of Components Registered to Container

When determining which dependency injection container to use in the
framework, the following contenders from the open-source community were
considered:
•

Illuminate Container [22]: Created by Taylor Otwell and used in the
Laravel and Lumen [23] frameworks

•

Pimple [24]: Created by Fabien Potencier of SensioLabs and used in the
Silex framework

•

Container [25]: Created by Phil Bennett and released through The League
of Extraordinary Packages (The PHP League)

To decide between these different containers, they were compared for: the
features they provided, the completeness of their documentation, the state of their
development, the complexity of their use, and overall size of the code base including
any dependencies. This comparison is shown in Table 1. From it, Phil Bennett’s
Container was chosen.
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Table 1. Comparison of Dependency Injection Containers
Package

Features

Documentation Development

Complexity Size

Container











Illuminate Container











Pimple











3.1.1.2 Routing Layer
Web applications operate through the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
[26], which expresses the conventions for a transaction of messages between a client
and server using a stateless request-response pattern. More specifically, the procedure
for a HTTP transaction is that a user interacts with a client, typically a web browser, to
send a request message containing a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) that identifies
both the server being contacted and the resource being requested. The contacted
server then attempts to locate the resource and returns an appropriate response
message to the client that is typically a HTML document rendered to the user. This
interaction is shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Flow of a HTTP Transaction

In the traditional architecture of a web application, requests to resources within
the application are handled by individual script files that handle any tasks and return a
response. The Porous framework uses an alternative approach called the frontcontroller pattern, where all requests are handled at a centralized point and the
resource itself is either programmatically generated or delegated to by the central
application. The role of the routing layer is to handle the request-response process
from the entry point to the web application.
The routing layer was created using a combination of open-course components.
The backbone of this layer consists of the Symfony HttpFoundation [27] component
and the HttpKernelInterface from the Symfony HttpKernel component [28]. These
components, amongst others, are part of a set of decoupled libraries used in the
Symfony framework. These specific components are also used in other popular
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frameworks and projects including Silex, Laravel, Lumen, Drupal [29], and phpBB
[30].
In native PHP, data from HTTP request and response messages are stored
across several of the language’s built-in superglobals, which are predefined variables
that are accessible everywhere in an application, including in all scopes. These
superglobals however, do not conform to the HTTP specification for HTTP request
and response messages and therefore require developers to address any gaps on their
own. As a result, the PHP Framework Interoperability Group (PHP-FIG) [31], which
is a group of representatives from various projects that creates and votes on standards
that are used to promote the reusability and sharing of code between each other’s
projects, has recently voted to accept the PHP Standard Recommendation 7 (PSR-7)
[32]. PSR-7 defines a set of HTTP message interfaces, therefore providing a common,
reusable layer for interacting with the HTTP protocol in an object-oriented manner.
The HttpFoundation component was largely influential in the creation of this standard
and provides implementations of these interfaces. Furthermore, by using the
HttpKernelInterface the framework is obligated to handle HTTP transactions by
accepting a request object and returning a response object.
The additional impact of using this standardized layer is that project-agnostic
middleware for hooking into the request-response process can be used by any
framework or project that implements these components. Specifically, any project that
uses the HttpKernelInterface can integrate middleware using the decorator pattern.
Igor Weidler’s Stack library [33] has been included with the routing layer and
simplifies the composition of HttpKernelInterface middleware by modeling them as
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layers being pushed onto a stack. An example of this can be seen in Figure 10. The
request object enters the stack and is processed by each middleware that decorates the
application. The response object is then processed in a similar fashion.

Figure 10. Stack of Middlewares Decorating Application

portrays

The actual handling of the request and response objects created using the
HttpFoundation component is performed by Phil Bennett’s Route package [34]. The
Route package allows for the definition of resource controllers by specifying a HTTP
request method and a Uniform Resource Locator (URL). The package’s router
inspects incoming requests to obtain this information and passes it to the dispatcher,
which then interprets this information to locate and dispatch the controller that then
builds and returns a response. As opposed to Figure 9, which shows the flow of HTTP
messages through a basic HTTP transaction, Figure 11 shows the flow of HTTP
messages as they traverse the routing layer of the application.
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Figure 11. Routing Flow through Application

3.1.2

Primary Components

The primary components of the framework are those that are necessary to provide the
dynamic logic of a web application. These components include a cookie jar, a session
manager, and a database manager.
This section will examine both the overall architecture and implementation
details of each of these components. Since the goals of the Porous framework
included being evocative of current vulnerabilities and to provide configurable
security features, there are two implementations of each component: a base
implementation with no security features and is therefore vulnerable; and a secure
implementation with configurable security features to fine tune how secure the
component is. When discussing the vulnerabilities exposed or mitigated by these
components, the associated category from the OWASP Top 10 is referenced in
parenthesis by its list identifier (A1 – A10).
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3.1.2.1 Cookie Jar
The cookie jar component deals with the creation and management of HTTP
cookies. HTTP cookies are small pieces of data (limited to 4096 bytes) that are sent in
the headers of a HTTP response message to be stored as a text file in a client web
browser. They are also sent back to the server on each request in the headers of a
request message. The data stored in a cookie may vary based on the individual use
cases of the web application. Most commonly, cookies are used to store
personalization settings, tracking information from advertisers, remember-me tokens
for logging a user back in, and session identifiers, which are used to authenticate users
of the web application. Other sensitive information may be stored in a cookie at the
discretion of the web application developer. For these reasons, cookies can often be
the target of malicious users.
The cookie jar component is the simplest of the three primary components. It
is implemented as an abstract class that defines methods for managing instances of the
Symfony Cookie class, which is part of the HttpFoundation component. The
vulnerable and secure implementations of the cookie jar extend this abstract class and
are required to implement methods for creating cookies and reading cookie data, as
shown in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. Architecture of Cookie Jar Component

A cookie consists of a name, a value, and a number of attributes that are given
default values if not specified. It should be noted that cookie attributes are not sent
back to the server but are only used by the browser to determine if the cookie should
be deleted and if the cookie name and value should be sent to the server. The areas of
interest regarding the security of cookies includes the value and the attributes. The
value of the cookie is the actual data being stored. The attributes include the
following:
•

expires – The time the cookie expires set as a Unix timestamp. If omitted
or set to zero, the cookie will expire when the client browser closes.

•

domain – The domain or subdomain the cookie is available to. Defaults to
the domain and all of its subdomains.

•

path – The path on the server the cookie is available to. Defaults to ‘/’,
which indicates that the cookie will be available within the entire domain.

32

•

httponly – Whether or not the cookie is accessible by client-side scripting
languages such as JavaScript. Defaults to true.

•

secure – Whether or not the cookie should only be transmitted over a
secure HTTPS connection. Defaults to false.

The vulnerable cookie jar implementation creates cookies whose values are
stored in a plaintext format, which is human readable. It also leaves all of the
attributes with their default settings.
The secure cookie jar implementation is slightly more complex in that it has
configuration settings to optionally encrypt and optionally sign a cookie’s value using
the Cryptography auxiliary component described in Section 3.1.3.3. Encrypting the
cookie’s value obfuscates its data into ciphertext that is no longer human readable. In
order to read the cookie’s value it would first need to be decrypted back to plaintext
using the same cipher and key used to encrypt it. Encrypting the cookie’s value
mitigates possible attacks due to sensitive data exposure (A6). Signing the cookie’s
value creates a unique digital signature of the data. Any change to the cookie’s data
would result in a different digital signature. By appending this signature to the cookie
value the cookie jar component can check if a cookie’s data has been altered by
unauthorized sources. This mechanism mitigates cross-site scripting (XSS) (A3)
attacks in which a malicious user would store JavaScript to be executed in the browser
inside of the cookie. Lastly, the secure implementation enables the httponly attribute
by default, which also mitigates XSS (A3) attacks by preventing scripting languages
from accessing the cookie.
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3.1.2.2 Session Manager
HTTP is a stateless protocol, meaning that data is not preserved when making
subsequent requests to a web application. In order to maintain state, sessions are
employed, which store an identifier cookie on the client side that refers to the actual
session data stored on the server side. The session manager component is therefore
responsible for supervising how both the session identifiers and session data are
stored. The data stored in sessions is typically used to authenticate users within a web
application. The security of session data is therefore imperative as authenticated users
may have access to sensitive information or may be given the authorization to perform
additional functions not intended for unauthorized users.
The session manager has two parts, the manager itself and the session handlers.
The manager acts as a wrapper around the functions PHP provides for working with
sessions, and also provides additional helper methods that allow the application
developer to add additional security mechanisms. The manager is implemented as an
abstract class that is extended by the vulnerable and secure manager implementations.
The vulnerable implementation simply calls the built-in PHP functions, while the
secure implementation adds additional logic that is considered to be best practices
when working with these functions. For instance, when starting a session on a new
request, the secure implementation can optionally regenerate the session identifier,
which can help prevent session fixation attacks since the old identifier is no longer tied
to the session data. Additionally, both implementations include methods for the
application developer to optionally expire a session after a period of idleness, bind a
session to the IP address and/or user agent of a client, and generate a cross-site request
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forgery (CSRF) token. The diagram in Figure 13 shows the architecture of the session
manager component. It should be noted that additional abstract session handlers exist,
however only the AbstractFileSessionHandler is shown for simplicity. Additional
information regarding these session handlers is provided in the text that follows.

Figure 13. Architecture of Session Manager Component

The actual storage of session data and construction of session identifiers is
controlled by PHP’s session handlers, whose methods are kept internal and are not
exposed to developers. The functions PHP provides for developers call these internal
methods to perform their prescribed tasks. As of PHP 5.4.0, the
SessionHandlerInterface was introduced, which allows developers to create custom
session handlers by overriding these internal methods. The session manager is
constructed by first passing in an implementation of the SessionHandlerInterface.
These custom handlers allow developers to control where and how the data is stored
and how the session identifier cookie is created. The Porous framework provides four
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custom session handlers. These include both a vulnerable and secure implementation
of a file-based handler, and a vulnerable and secure implementation of a databasebased handler. The secure implementations of the file and database handlers can be
optionally configured to encrypt the session data and can optionally encrypt, sign, and
set attributes to the session identifier cookie similarly to what was discussed in the
previous section. Additionally, the storage path of file-based sessions can be set.
The security mechanisms described in this section can help mitigate
vulnerabilities of sensitive data exposure (A6), flaws due to broken authentication and
session management (A2), and cross-site request forgery attacks (A8).
3.1.2.3 Database Manager
As explained by Anthony Ferrara, a Developer Advocate at Google, a common
model for web applications is to present them as a union of n-tiers [35] that are
responsible for conceptually different processes. Almost all web applications utilize at
least two tiers that enable their dynamic nature. The first tier is the application server
that controls the logical operations of the web application. The second tier is the
database that is used to store the actual data used by these logical operations. The
database manager component acts as an abstraction layer for communication between
the application logic and the data stored in the database.
The implementation of the database manager consists of three subcomponents:
the database connector, the query builder, and the compiler. The database connector
employs the factory pattern to create data source names (DSN), which are formatted
strings that describe a connection to a data source. The connector passes this DSN to a
PHP Data Object (PDO) to create a database connection. PDO supports drivers for a
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number of different database types; however the factory only supports creating DSNs
for MySQL, PostgreSQL, and SQLite at this time.
The query builder is the main subcomponent with which application
developers interact. It is implemented as a fluent interface in which methods are
chained together to build an object whose properties represent the different clauses of
a structured query language (SQL) statement. The utilization of a fluent interface
gives developers a readable API for building queries. The query builder is also
responsible for passing compiled queries to the database connection to be executed.
The query builder is also implemented as an abstract class whose subclasses are
responsible for determining how the query is to be executed. The vulnerable
implementation uses the PDO’s query method, which simply takes a raw SQL
statement and executes it on the database server. The secure implementation uses
PDO’s prepare and execute methods for creating prepared statements and then binding
the values of variables to these statements that are then executed. A prepared
statement is analogous to a template that is precompiled in the database driver, and
therefore cannot be modified when variables are passed into it. As a result, prepared
statements are immune to SQL injection vulnerabilities (A1), which can cause
sensitive data exposure (A6) by allowing malicious users to execute statements that
may read or modify data in the database.
Below, Figure 14 presents a subset of the state machine for the fluent query
builder. Each state represents a method that is chained onto the requisite methods.
Each query begins by specifying the table you are working with. There are then
numerous methods that may be chained together to specify the data you are working
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with. A query is completed by calling a method that indicates what is to be done with
the data.

Figure 14. Subset of Fluent Query Builder State Machine

The last subcomponent is the compiler, which takes the properties of a query
object and translates them into a SQL statement. The compiler consists of an interface
that describes the methods needed to generate different types of SQL queries. The
vulnerable and secure implementations implement these methods to return raw SQL
statements and prepared statements with bound parameters, respectively.
The overall architecture of the database manager component can be seen in
Figure 15, which also shows the relationships between the database manager’s
subcomponents. To recap, the ConnectionFactory creates an implementation of an
AbstractConnector, which specifies a data source to be used when creating a PDO
connection. Query objects are then generated using a fluent interface from an
implementation of the AbstractQueyBuilder. These objects are then compiled to SQL
statements by an implementation of the AbstractCompiler and executed.
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Figure 15. Architecture of Database Manager Component

3.1.3

Auxiliary Components
The last part of the framework’s architecture is the addition of auxiliary

components that act as either dependencies for other components in the framework or
provide supplementary functionality for application developers to use. These auxiliary
components include the Event Manager, Logger, Cryptography, Validation, and
Template Engine.
3.1.3.1 Event Manager
The event manager component allows application developers to hook into the
web application by using the Publish-subscribe design pattern for event-driven
programming. By default, the Porous framework has event listeners registered to
listen for events that occur during the request-response cycle - including when a
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request is received, a response is created, and when a response is sent back to the
client. The event manager may be used to automate logging when events occur, or to
support the business needs of more complex applications.
The event manager used in the Porous framework is the open-source package
aptly called Event, which was developed by Frank de Jonge [36]. Other event
managers considered for inclusion in the framework included Symfony’s Event
Dispatcher [37] and Sabre’s Event Emitter [38]. Symfony’s Event Dispatcher is by
far the most popular solution as it is used by the Symfony framework. However, it
introduces several dependencies that would substantially increase the overall size of
the Porous framework. Comparatively, neither Event nor Sabre’s Event Emitter
require any additional dependencies. I chose Event over Event Emitter due to its more
exhaustive documentation and due to having more than double the install base
(~81,000 installations vs ~39,000 at the time of this writing).
3.1.3.2 Logger
The logger component was included to allow developers to log different events
that occur within a web application. Specific use cases may include to record error
messages, track data, or to provide and audit trail for different actions. The log files
generated by a web application could be used to support application users participating
in a cyber challenge or to help provide additional information for cyber challenge
moderators.
The logging package chosen for inclusion in the framework is Monolog [39],
which was developed by Jordi Boggiano. Monolog is the most popular logging library
available in PHP.
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3.1.3.3 Cryptography
The cryptography component is the only auxiliary component that was
developed rather than taken from the open-source community. This component is a
dependency for the secure implementations of both the cookie jar and session manager
components. The component includes interfaces for encryption and hashing methods
as well as an implementation of each interface, as shown in Figure 16.

Figure 16. Architecture of Cryptography Component

The included Encrypt class acts as a wrapper around PHP’s MCrypt extension
[40] that can be configured to perform the different types of encryption supported by
MCrypt. By default, the Encrypt class is configured to perform encryption using the
Rijndael algorithm [41], which is used by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[42] selected by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
The included Hash class acts as a wrapper around PHP’s hash, hash_hmac,
and password_hash functions and includes helper methods for comparing hash values.
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The hash function creates a digital signature of data, the hash_hmac function creates a
keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC), which can be used to sign data,
and the password_hash function is used specifically for hashing passwords using the
bcrypt algorithm, which is based on the Blowfish cipher [43]. By default, the Hash
class is configured to use the SHA-256 algorithm [44] for both the hash and
hash_hmac functions. While the password_hash function uses bcrypt, the Hash class
can override the method to use a less secure hashing algorithm such as MD5 in order
to introduce vulnerabilities for applications built using this framework.
3.1.3.4 Validation
The implementations of the primary components are able to introduce and
mitigate a wide range of vulnerabilities. However, they do not support any form of
data validation, which can be imperative when properly securing a web application.
Since the validation of data is reliant on the context and type of data being validated, it
is left to the application developer to properly perform. To secure a web application it
is expected that all user input is filtered when output. The validation library I chose
for inclusion in the Porous framework is Respect’s Validation developed by Henrique
Moody [45]. According to Chris Cornutt, PHP security expert and member of
Hewlett-Packard’s Global Cyber Securtiy Group, Respect’s Validation library has
become one of the de-facto standards for doing data validation in PHP [46].
3.1.3.5 Template Engine
A template engine was included in the framework to assist application
developers in creating the HTML documents for their web applications. Three
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different template libraries were considered for the framework including SensioLab’s
Twig [47], Illuminate’s Blade [48], and the PHP League’s Plates [49]. Both Twig and
Blade are compiled templates, while Plates is a native template engine that was
inspired by Twig. When considering these options, size was a major determining
factor in choosing which engine to include. With its dependencies Illuminate’s Blade
is ~3 MB in size, Twig ~1 MB, and Plates only ~40 KB. Ultimately, I chose Plates for
the Porous framework due to its size and minimal learning curve.
3.2 Testing Procedures
The previous section described the methodologies used to implement the Porous
web application framework. This section will identify the experiments that were
conducted and how they were used to evaluate the effectiveness of this solution in
meeting the goals defined in Section 1.3.
3.2.1

Primary Component Vulnerability Tests
The first set of experiments conducted were used to assess the presence of

vulnerabilities in the framework’s primary components. Each of these experiments,
unless otherwise noted, were conducted twice: once for the vulnerable
implementation, and once for the secure implementation with its security features
configured. In order to test for vulnerabilities in these components, tests directly from
the OWASP Testing Guide (OTG) [14] were used when applicable. These tests are
referenced by their identifier in the form of OTG-CATEGORY-###. It should be
noted that in many cases only portions of an OTG test were completed since a
considerable amount of them rely on an application’s business logic rather than a
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component’s implementation. In cases where no OTG test was available to assess a
vulnerability, additional procedures were established by considering information from
the OWASP Top 10 or through general understanding of security principles and the
underlying technologies.
A summary of these tests can be seen in the table below:

Table 2. Summary of Primary Component Tests
Cookie Jar Tests
Test
Description
Testing for Cookies Attributes (OTG-SESS-002) Tests the appropriate setting of
cookie attributes.
Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of
Tests the human readability of
OTG-SESS-001)
cookie data.
Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of
Tests for the ability to modify
OTG-SESS-001
cookie data.
Session Manager Tests
Test
Description
Testing for Cookies Attributes (OTG-SESS-002) Tests the appropriate setting of
session cookie attributes.
Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of
Tests the human readability of the
OTG-SESS-001)
session identifier and stored
session data.
Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of
Tests for the ability to modify
OTG-SESS-001
session cookie data.
Testing for Session Fixation (Segment of OTGTests the regeneration of session
SESS-003)
identifiers.
Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery (OTGTests for possibility of CSRF
SESS-005)
attacks.
Testing for Session Validity (OTG-SESS-007)
Tests the ability to verify a
session’s authenticity.
Database Manager Tests
Test
Description
Testing for SQL Injection (OTG-INPVAL-005)
Tests the possibility of SQL
injection.
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3.2.1.1 Cookie Jar Tests
To test for vulnerabilities in the different implementations of the cookie jar
component the following experiments were performed:
3.2.1.1.1

Testing for Cookie Attributes (OTG-SESS-002)

The purpose of this experiment was to verify that appropriate default settings
for cookie attributes were applied to cookies generated by the cookie jar component.
More specifically, this experiment tested for the enabling of the httponly attribute,
which when enabled, prevents access to cookies from client-side scripting languages
such as JavaScript. The omission of this attribute introduces a vulnerability to crosssite scripting (XSS) attacks.
It should be noted that the referenced test OTG-SESS-02 also recommends
testing the secure, domain, path, and expires attributes. However, the setting of these
attributes is dependent on the context of the cookie within the application, and is
therefore left to the application developer to implement correctly. Therefore, rather
than testing for an appropriate default setting, I tested the ability to set these attributes
instead.
To perform this experiment, a web application was created that generated a
cookie. The attributes and their values were then inspected by observing the HTTP
response headers sent by the web application using the OWASP Zed Attack Proxy
(ZAP) [50], an intercepting proxy and web application penetration testing tool.
3.2.1.1.2

Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of OTG-SESS-001)
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The purpose of this experiment was to check for the possibility of information
leakage by storing the cookie’s data in plaintext, a human readable format. The
storing of data in plaintext introduces a vulnerability to sensitive data exposure
through network eavesdropping or local machine access.
To perform this experiment a web application was created that generated a
cookie with a name of “foo” and a value of “bar”. Using ZAP, the HTTP response
headers were inspected to check the readability of the cookie’s value.
3.2.1.1.3

Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of OTG-SESS-001)

This purpose of this experiment was to test a cookie’s resistance to malicious
attempts of modification. A lack of resistance to such modification introduces a
vulnerability to an exploit known as cookie tampering (also known as cookie
poisoning), which may be used to perform a variety of attacks.
To perform this experiment, a web application was created that generated a
cookie named “foo” with a value of “bar”. The web application then rendered the
value of the cookie by printing it in the client web browser, Google Chrome. The
value of the cookie was then modified using the Google Chrome extension
EditThisCookie. Once modified, the resource that rendered the cookie’s value was
refreshed and the value printed in the browser was inspected.
3.2.1.2 Session Manager Tests
The tests in this section were performed to test for vulnerabilities in the session
manager component and its session handlers. Additionally, tests were performed to
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verify that the helper methods provided for application developers were functioning
properly.
3.2.1.2.1

Testing for Cookie Attributes (OTG-SESS-002)

The purpose and procedure of this experiment is identical to that of experiment
3.2.1.1.1, but within the context of a session cookie, which is handled independently
of the cookie component. In addition to the httponly attribute, the configuration of the
secure attribute was tested.
3.2.1.2.2

Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of OTG-SESS-001)

The purpose and procedure of this experiment is identical to that of experiment
3.2.1.1.2, but within the context of a session cookie. In addition, the possibility of
information leakage of session data stored on the server was tested by its readability as
plaintext. Depending on the handler, the data was inspected either in the session files
or the database table in which sessions were stored.
3.2.1.2.3

Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of OTG-SESS-001)

The purpose and procedure of this experiment are identical to that of
experiment of 3.2.1.1.3, but within the context of a session cookie.
3.2.1.2.4

Testing for Session Fixation (Segment of OTG-SESS-003)

The purpose of this experiment was to test if sessions are vulnerable to fixation
attacks. A session fixation attack occurs when an attacker forces a session identifier
for a web application upon a victim. When the victim authenticates themselves with
the web application, the same session identifier is used. Since the attacker knows
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what the identifier is, the attacker is able to hijack the session by using the now
authenticated identifier.
To perform this experiment, a web application was created that requires a user
to authenticate themselves using a predetermined set of credentials to access an
administrative area. Firefox was then used to access the application and start a
session. The session cookie was then copied into Google Chrome. The application
was then logged into from Chrome using the predefined credentials. It was then
checked if the administrative area could be accessed through Firefox.
3.2.1.2.5

Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery (OTG-SESS-005)

The purpose of this experiment was to test for the possibility of cross site
request forgery (CSRF) attacks by verifying a web application’s trust in requests from
users that are made to it. Specifically, this experiment tests the Session Manager’s
methods for generating and verifying a CSRF token that is stored in a session’s data.
To perform this experiment a web application was created that allows
authenticated users to delete a database entry by submitting a form. After logging into
the application a second web application was accessed that contained a hidden form
that forges a request to the first application. It was then checked if the first web
application honored the request and deleted the database entry.
3.2.1.2.6

Testing for Session Validity (Includes OTG-SESS-007)

The purpose of this experiment was two-fold: to test the session manager’s
ability to identify a user based on their user-agent and/or IP address and to test the
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session manager’s ability to invalidate a session after a defined period of inactivity.
This functionality provides a rudimentary defense against session hijacking attacks.
To perform this experiment, a web application was created that starts a session.
Using OWASP ZAP, HTTP requests were then created that contained headers with
user-agents and IP addresses that were different than the ones that started the session.
It was then checked if the web application invalidated the session due to these
changes. Additionally, the timeout functionality was tested for correctness by setting
a predefined idle time and checking for a timeout after the prescribed amount of time.
3.2.1.3 Database Manager Tests
To test for vulnerabilities in the different implementations of the database
manager component the following experiments were performed:
3.2.1.3.1

Testing for SQL Injection (OTG-INPVAL-005)

The purpose of this experiment was to determine if the queries compiled by the
database manager component were vulnerable to SQL injection attacks, which could
allow malicious users to read or modify the contents of a database potentially exposing
sensitive data or causing harm to an organization.
To perform this experiment, a web application was created with the
functionalities to create, read, update, and delete data from a database containing
dummy data. Each of these operations were tested using SQLMap [49], an opensource penetration testing tool that automates the detection and exploitation of SQL
injection flaws.
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CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

This chapter presents the results that were gathered by performing the experiments
described in Section 3.2.
4.1 Primary Component Vulnerability Results
This set of experiments set out to assess the presence of vulnerabilities in the
proposed vulnerable and secure implementations of each of the primary components.
A summary of these results is shown in the table below followed by individual results
for each of these experiments.

Table 3. Summary of Primary Component Tests Results
Cookie Jar Tests
Test
Testing for Cookies Attributes (OTG-SESS-002)
Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of OTG-SESS-001)
Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of OTG-SESS-001
Session Manager Tests
Test
Testing for Cookies Attributes (OTG-SESS-002)
Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of OTG-SESS-001)
Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of OTG-SESS-001
Testing for Session Fixation (Segment of OTG-SESS-003)
Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery (OTG-SESS-005)
Testing for Session Validity (OTG-SESS-007)
Database Manager Tests
Test
Testing for SQL Injection (OTG-INPVAL-005)
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Pass / Fail
Pass
Pass
Pass
Description
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Pass
Description
Pass

4.1.1

Cookie Jar Results
To revisit the exact details of each of the following experiments for the cookie

jar component refer to section 3.2.1.1.
4.1.1.1 Testing for Cookie Attributes (OTG-SESS-002)
This experiment set out to verify that the appropriate default configuration
settings for cookie attributes were applied to each implementation of the cookie jar
component. The results of this experiment were gathered by visual inspection of the
HTTP response headers sent by the web application using the OWASP ZAP tool.
Upon inspection of these headers, I determined that each vulnerable and secure
implementations set the httponly attribute by having it set to false and true,
respectively. Additionally, both implementations able to correctly set the secure,
domain, path, and expires attributes on demand.
As a result of this experiment, I concluded that the vulnerable and secure
implementations of the cookie jar component can accurately expose and mitigate
vulnerabilities associated with setting of cookie attributes including certain instances
of XSS attacks (A3).
4.1.1.2 Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of OTG-SESS-001)
This experiment set out to check for the possibility of information leakage
caused by the storage of data in a cookie’s value in a human readable plaintext format.
The results of this experiment were gathered by visually inspecting the HTTP
response headers using the OWASP ZAP tool. Upon inspection of these headers I saw
that the vulnerable implementation of the cookie jar showed the expected value of
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“bar”. Contrarily, the secure implementation obfuscated the data by utilizing the
Cryptography component to encrypt and encode the cookie’s value. The exact values
that were stored in the cookies tested during this experiment are in the table below.

Table 4. Testing for Information Leakage Comparison
Implementation
Vulnerable
Secure

Cookie Value
bar
GmNegLfvVYlhG1gde4vs5NVIrkw01WUv2FEWcGuuI0c%
3D

As a result of this experiment, I concluded that the vulnerable and secure
implementations of the cookie jar component can accurately expose and mitigate
sensitive data exposure vulnerabilities (A6) associated with the storing of cookie data
in plaintext.
4.1.1.3 Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of OTG-SESS-001)
This experiment set out to determine if a cookie was resistant to malicious
attempts of modification. The results of this experiment were gathered by visually
inspecting the output of the web application that rendered the cookie value in the web
browser. Upon inspection of the rendered web page I saw that a cookie created using
the vulnerable implementation could be modified and have its value rendered as
normal. Contrarily, the value of a cookie created using the secure implementation was
not rendered in the browser. Instead, the web application simply ignored the cookie
altogether. This was due to the fact that the signature generated from the modified
data could not be validated against the signature that was generated by the original
data. In order to successfully modify a cookie’s data an attacker would need to
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reverse engineer the algorithm used to create the signature. By default, the cookie jar
component uses an HMAC code to sign the data that would require the attacker to also
gain access to the key used in the algorithm. However, the cookie jar can also be
configured to use a weaker algorithm such as MD5, which is easily recognizable. If
recognized, the attacker could then modify the cookie. The values rendered in the
browser for the cookie data before and after modification are in the tables below.
Table 5. Cookie Data before Modification
Implementation
Vulnerable
Secure (HMAC)

Secure (MD5)

Stored Value
bar
bar-14b473a0d902a7a38187d2b2bc2
e092d63050b110c9d9fe04be342
cf97581eb5
bar-37b51d194a7513e45b56f6524f2
d51f2

Value Displayed
bar
bar

bar

Table 6. Cookie Data after Modification
Implementation
Vulnerable
Secure (HMAC)
Secure (HMAC)

Stored Value
Value Displayed
qux
qux
qux
qux-14b473a0d902a7a38187d2b2bc2
e092d63050b110c9d9fe04be342
cf97581eb5
qux-Secure (MD5)
37b51d194a7513e45b56f6524f2
d51f2
qux-qux
Secure (MD5 –
d85b1213473c2fd7c2045020a6b
Recognized)
9c62b
As a result of this experiment, I concluded that the vulnerable and secure
implementations of the cookie jar component accurately expose and mitigate
vulnerabilities associated with the tampering of cookie data at a granular level.
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4.1.2

Session Manager Results
To revisit the exact details of each of the following tests for the session

manager component, refer to section 3.2.1.2.
4.1.2.1 Testing for Cookie Attributes (OTG-SESS-002)
This experiment set out to verify that the appropriate default configuration
settings were set for the attributes of a session cookie. The results of this experiment
are nearly identical to those found in Section 4.1.1.1. The exception to these results is
due to the additional requirement that the secure implementations of the session
handlers are configured to have session cookies sent over an encrypted connection by
enabling the secure attribute. Upon visual inspection, I determined that the setting of
this attribute was correct for both the vulnerable and secure implementations of the
session handlers.
As a result of this experiment, I concluded that the vulnerable and secure
implementations of the session handlers can correctly expose or mitigate
vulnerabilities associated with the cookie attributes of a session cookie. These include
possible vulnerabilities due to broken authentication and session management (A2),
XSS (A3), and sensitive data exposure (A6).
4.1.2.2 Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of OTG-SESS-001)
This experiment set out to identify the possibility of information leakage by
both the session cookie and the session data stored on the server. The results
pertaining to the session cookie are identical to those in Section 4.1.1.2. The results of
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testing for information leakage in the session data was concluded in a similar manner
by visually inspecting the location in which the session data was stored.
The vulnerable implementations of the session handlers store session data as
key-value pairs in a human readable plaintext format. Conversely, the secure
implementations of the session handlers store data in an obfuscated format that has
been serialized as well as encrypted and encoded like the secure cookies. The exact
data stored by the session handlers can be seen in the table below.

Table 7. Comparison of Stored Session Data
Implementation
Vulnerable
Secure

Session Data
s:52:"username|s:7:"johndoe";email|s:16:"jdo
e@example.com";";
s:108:"lvbdVMs9VMmMulAOkbrsGr00QMfVf/c8k0Vod
UfJtmMkdIW6ZDoL/6iS8Ut8Xfdp/gQoioxkAx1Q7Hlo2
Rrgu5uf7lqIL0RcJOO0ZcDP8qM=";

As a result of this experiment, I concluded that the vulnerable and secure
session handlers correctly store data to expose and mitigate vulnerabilities pertaining
to the leakage of information from session data. This includes possible vulnerabilities
due to broken authentication and session management (A2), XXS (A3), and sensitive
data exposure (A6).
4.1.2.3 Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of OTG-SESS-001)
This experiment set out to determine if a session cookie was resistant to
malicious attempts of modification. The results of this experiment are identical to
those in Section 4.1.1.3. However, additional implications of these results include the
possible exposure to and mitigation of session hijacking attacks.
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4.1.2.3.1

Testing for Session Fixation (Segment of OTG-SESS-003)

This experiment set out to specifically determine if sessions could possibly be
vulnerable to certain incarnations of session fixation attacks. The results of this
experiment were gathered by visually inspecting session cookies to see if their
identifiers were regenerated and by attempting to bypass the authentication
mechanism of the login form to directly access the administrative section of the web
application. With the vulnerable implementation of the session manager, the session
identifier is never regenerated. Therefore, when a session was authenticated in one
browser it was also authenticated in the other browser that shared the same session
identifier. Contrarily, with the secure implementation the session identifier was
regenerated on each request, which invalidated the old session identifier after logging
into the application.
As a result of this experiment, I concluded that the vulnerable and secure
implementations of the session manager component appropriately expose and mitigate
session fixation attacks (A2) that are reliant on the regeneration of session identifiers.
4.1.2.4 Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery (OTG-SESS-005)
This experiment set out to determine if the methods in the session manager
could be used to verify a request coming into the application through the use of a
CSRF token. The results of this experiment showed that these methods were working
as intended since the forged request was not honored by the application. A CSRF
token is stored in a user’s session data and is regenerated on every request. This token
must appear as a hidden form field in any form that is submitted to the application in
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order to be verified. Since the forged request did not contain the session’s token it was
ignored by the application.
As a result of this experiment, I concluded that these methods do function
correctly and may be used by the application developer to prevent CSRF attacks.
4.1.2.5 Testing for Session Validity (Includes OTG-SESS-007)
This experiment set out to determine if the methods in the session manager
component could be used to check the validity of a session by associating it with
client-specific data. The results of this experiment were gathered by inspecting the
behaviors of the web application when HTTP request headers were forged with
different user-agent strings and IP addresses. The results of this experiment showed
that these methods were working as intended since the web application denied access
to an authorized-only area of the web application. The timeout functionality of the
session manager also worked as intended. When a request was made after an allowed
period of idle time of three minutes, the session was destroyed.
As a result of this experiment, I concluded that these methods do function
correctly and may be used by the application developer to introduce additional
security features to a web application.
4.1.3

Database Manager Results
To revisit the exact details of each of the following tests for the database

manager component refer to section 3.2.1.3.
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4.1.3.1 Testing for SQL Injection (OTG-INPVAL-005)
This experiment set out to determine if the queries compiled by the database
manager component were vulnerable to SQL injection attacks (A1). This experiment
was broken down into separate tests for each of the major query operations: select,
insert, update, and delete. The results of running SQLMap against different parts of a
web application that uses these queries showed that the vulnerable implementation
was vulnerable to SQL injection in all four cases. More specifically, SQLMap found
the queries vulnerable to Boolean-based blind injection, error-based injection,
AND/OR time-based blind injection and union query injection. As expected,
SQLMap was unable to perform any injection attacks on the secure implementation of
the component. As a result, I concluded that the vulnerable and secure
implementations of the database manager component correctly expose or mitigate
SQL injection vulnerabilities.
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CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

5.1 Conclusions
The previous chapter presented the results that were collected by testing the web
application framework designed and implemented using the methodologies described
in Chapter 3. This chapter will now reflect on those methodologies and review the
testing results to make implications regarding whether or not the methodologies used
to develop the web application framework were able to achieve the goals defined in
Section 1.3.
5.1.1

Goal 1 Conclusions

The first goal of this project was to develop a web application framework that is
able to simplify the development of vulnerable web applications. The framework
developed in this thesis was able to simplify the development of web applications by
providing abstractions and interfaces to common web functionalities including routing
and the management of sessions, cookies, and databases. This is evidenced by the
creation of the primary components, which include methods for providing these
functionalities. Furthermore, many of these abstractions were due to the inclusion of
popular community projects and standards set by the PHP-FIG that were created
specifically for simplifying the development of PHP web applications. Based on the
application developer target audience, which was defined to have had experience with
developing applications using native PHP and other web application frameworks, the

59

developers creating applications should already have a familiarity with some of these
components such as the HttpFoundation component and the HttpKernelInterface.
In addition, the Porous framework specifically sought to simplify the development
of vulnerable web applications. This was achieved by building on these components
and making abstractions to different security implementations of components. This
was verified by the various primary component tests.
5.1.2

Goal 2 Conclusions

The second goal of this project was to develop a web application framework that
provides configurable security features for introducing vulnerabilities to web
applications. This goal was achieved by the inclusion of both a vulnerable and secure
implementation of each primary component. As described in the methodologies
sections for each component, the base implementation contains no security options by
default. The secure implementations however, provide configuration options to
granularly control the security mechanism for each component. For instance, the
cookie jar component provides the options of whether or not to encrypt a cookie, sign
a cookie, and what algorithms are used to do either of these tasks. The session
component provides these same options for its identifier as well as options to
regenerate the identifier and change its default name. The session data may also be
optionally encrypted and stored in non-default locations. Lastly, the database
component can be configured to use raw SQL statements or prepared statements.
Each of these configuration options were again tested during the primary component
tests and are configurable by setting these options in a main configuration file for the
application.
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5.1.3

Goal 3 Conclusions

The third goal of this project was to develop a web application framework that is
evocative of current web application security concerns. This has been evidenced
throughout the primary component tests that reference the categories of vulnerabilities
that the various security mechanisms expose or mitigate from the OWASP Top 10.
The test results show which of the categories of vulnerabilities can be directly
exposed and mitigated by configuring the primary components of the framework. The
table below provides a mapping of these categories to the components that are
affected.
Table 8. OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities Exposed and Mitigated
OWASP Top 10 Category
A1 – Injection
A2 – Broken Authentication and Session
Management
A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
A4 – Insecure Direct Object References
A5 – Security Misconfiguration
A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure
A7 – Missing Function Level Access
A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery
A9 – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
A10 – Unvalidated Redirected and Forwards

Components Affected
Database
Cookie, Session
Cookie, Session
--Cookie, Session, Database
Cookie, Session, Database
----Cookie, Session, Database
---

Based on these results, the configuration of the primary components directly
addresses six of the ten categories. The remaining four categories may be addressed
by the business logic of the application.
A4 – Insecure Direct Object References refers to flaws that expose a reference to
resources without any proper restrictions. The example attack provided by the
OWASP Top 10 for this vulnerability is when an application uses unverified data to
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access the account information for another user. The solution to preventing this type
of an attack would be to validate that the account information for the logged in user
matches the account information being modified. This could be handled by using a
combination of logic from the session manager and/or auxiliary validation component.
A7 – Missing Function Level Access refers to flaws that allow non-privileged users
to access functions that should only be available to authorized users. The example
attack provided by the OWASP Top 10 for this vulnerability is when an attacker
accesses a URL that should only be available to authorized users. Again, this can be
prevented using either the session manager or validation component to ensure that a
user accessing a URL has the correct level of authorization to access the resource.
A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery refers to flaws where an attacker tricks
authenticated users into performing unintended actions through the use of forged
HTTP requests. While the session manager component does contain methods for
generating and verifying CSRF tokens it does not support the injection of these tokens
into the HTML of a rendered web page as a hidden form field. It would be up to the
application developer to individually add these hidden form fields to every form they
use in their application.
A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards refers to flaws where an attacker takes
advantage of a redirect or forward feature within a web application to send a victim to
a malicious location or to access unauthorized resources. The solution to this category
of flaws would be to not use redirects or forwards that allow for user parameters. If
allowed, then the user input should be validated using the validation component.
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Overall, based on this information the Porous framework can be seen as evocative
of current web application security concerns through direct and indirect use of the
primary and auxiliary components
5.1.4

Goal 4 Conclusions

The fourth goal of this project was to create a web application framework that is
extensible. Proof that this goal was achieved can be seen in the architecture of the
Porous framework’s core. The dependency injection container allows components to
be added and swapped into the framework by storing definitions that provide the
construction details of each component. Each component, both primary and auxiliary,
was added to the framework by writing these service provider definitions and
registering them with the container. Additionally, the routing component, which is
based on the HttpFoundation component and the HttpKernelInterface allows for
community middleware to be added to the framework. Together, the dependency
injection container and routing layer provide the extensibility that was desired to meet
this goal.
5.2 Future Work
The Porous framework developed for this project was able to successfully meet
each of the four goals described above. However, at this point the Porous framework
is still in its infancy and additional work can and should be done to bring this project
to its fullest potential. Over the course of developing this framework the following
areas of future work are seen as parts of the framework that may be developed at a
later time.
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5.2.1

Further Evaluation
Perhaps the most important consideration when drawing conclusions from the

results of the experiments conducted on this framework is that no implementation is
ever going to be completely secure against all vulnerabilities. Additional testing
should be done to check for vulnerabilities that were overlooked or missed during the
completion of this project. It would be beneficial for other developers and security
experts to audit the code of this framework in order to locate any of these
vulnerabilities and provide any additional insights on how to prevent them.
5.2.2

Additional Components and Implementations
Another future extension to this project would be to construct additional

components or implementations of existing components. This would allow for added
customization for application developers who may be seeking particular functionalities
for the web applications that they build. Suggested components to be added to the
framework would be authentication and authorization libraries for managing users.
5.2.3

Intrusion Detection System
The next area of future work would be the possible integration of an intrusion

detection system. An intrusion detection system could be of use when web
applications built using the framework are used in a cyber challenge. This, combined
with the event manager component, could provide application users or challenge
moderators with a means of logging the exact exploitations that take place within the
vulnerable components of the framework. Existing intrusion detection systems may
be looked at as possible candidates for inclusion in later releases of the framework.
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5.2.4

Command Line Interface
A command line interface to the framework would be a nicety for application

developers by providing them with tools to generate keys, application templates, and
content. Additionally, a command line interface could include the functions for
database migrations and seeding, which would accelerate the process of some of this
other content generation.
5.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, the Porous web application framework was successful in meeting its
goals. It has the potential to be a significant contributor to the open-source community
and cyber security communities by allowing them to develop realistic vulnerable web
applications relatively simply and have these web applications be easily extensible to
facilitate reuse. While this project was successful, it should be seen as just the
beginning as the framework should continue to grow over time.
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